



The recent Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not accord
with the view (so fashionable among legal scholars during the thirties) that
an international agreement may lawfully be terminated only by a new
agreement between the parties or following a declaration authorizing termi-
nation by an international tribunal.'
Nor does the Convention support the opposite view that it is unlawful
for a party to enforce, by self-help, treaty obligations whenever the other
party claims that some legal grounds of termination or invalidity are appli-
cable to the case. Article 65 of the Convention which prescribes the
strategies and procedures to be followed in disputes about termination and
invalidity, does not force upon us the traditional either-or concept of
termination or invalidity. Such a notion, it will be further explained, is
unrealistic. It rests on assumptions that do not accord with modern condi-
tions.
A. Unilateral Termination of a Treaty
Earlier, the International Law Commission which had prepared the Law
of Treaties' Convention before it had been deliberated upon, changed and
adopted at the Vienna conference, concluded that Article 65 "represents
the highest measure of common ground that could be found among govern-
ments as well as in the Commission on this question."2 The Article in its
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final form appears to have been a compromise in which unresolved
differences were neutralized in ambiguity. Its formulation is in itself symp-
tomatic of many problems. The first four subsections of Article 65 read as
follows:
I. A party which, under the provisions of the present Convention, invokes
either a defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for
impeaching the validity of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it or
suspending its operation, must notify the other parties of its claim. The
notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to
the treaty and the reasons therefor.
2. If, after the expiry of a period which, except in cases of special urgency,
shall not be less than three months after the receipt of the notification, no
party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry
out in the manner provided in Article 67 the measure which it has proposed.
3. If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties
shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
4. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations
of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to
the settlement of disputes.3
The specific means of settling disputes indicated in Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter are "negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choice." The parties are bound to seek a
solution to the dispute through these means.
This verbal commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes is not accom-
panied by presentation and analysis of specific policies that ought to guide
or govern. Article 65 has sails but no anchor. Which of these methods
should be given priority in the solution of conflicts of termination? The
ILC Commentary to draft Article 65, and the majority of writers on the
subject, seem to prefer adjudication. But according to the International
Court itself, adjudication, as currently employed in the international arena,
is the least adequate method for settling most disputes of termination.
4
38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 703 (1969).4There have been only a few explicit judicial cases of termination, and they have held that
the termination of international agreements is a "legislative" and not a "judicial" function.
The International Court usually did not render a negative decision in these cases, but simply
refused to decide on various grounds. The party in possession of the disputed values won the
dispute by default of the Court. See The Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex,
P.C.I.J., A, No. 24, at 38, 42 (1930); the claim was rejected in this case on factual grounds.
The International Court in 1966 rejected on procedural grounds, claims for the termination of
the South West Africa Mandate Agreement; [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 7. The Court directed the
parties to the "international legislator," but did not indicate who that entity was. See Reisman,
Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. I NT'L L. 3, 76 (1966- 7). Other cases of
termination which the Court refused to decide are The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case
[1952] I.C.J. Rep. 103; Northern Cameroons Case [1963] I.C.J. Rep. 15. For a contextual
analysis of decisions refusing to decide, see W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION
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Regardless, the failure of Article 65 to provide specific favored methods
for settling disputes is unfortunate. Suppose a party claims termination,
giving proper notification. The other side objects. The claimant proposes
negotiations. The objecting side, believing that adjudication is a more
suitable method for preserving treaties, insists on adjudication. What then?
To reach a deadlock a party has only to insist on a different method for
settling the dispute. Such cases, in which the parties reach a stalemate from
the outset, are all too common in disputes of termination. As of this
writing, the latest and most dramatic is the Anglo-Spanish conflict over
Gibraltar.5
Any of the parties to the dispute may, in case of a deadlock after a
period of twelve months following the date on which an objection to the
claim was raised, set in motion the conciliation procedure provided for in
the Annex of the Convention. This procedure is, however, a novelty in
international affairs; its future effectiveness in resolving conflicts cannot be
taken for granted. The Convention's Annex provides for the establishment
in particular disputes of an ad hoc "conciliation commission" within which
the parties may argue and actually negotiate their differences. The Com-
mission seems to be a semi adjudicative-conciliatory organ. Its structure
and functions have many advantages and thus may promote constructive
settlements of particular disputes.6 But it also suffers from important short-
625- 34 (197 I). Non-decisions- decisions refusing to decide-are real decisions despite judi-
cial attempts to characterize them differently, and in this context of claims to termination and
invalidity they are in effect negative decisions-decisions that reject the claim.
5N.Y. Times, June 10, 1967, p. 2, col. 3 (late city ed.). For a discussion of ICJ cases
requiring negotiation before submission to adjudication, see Reisman, id., at 359.
6Note the marked differences in function and competence between this procedure of the
"Conciliation Commission" and the traditional adjudication or conciliation. The general
principle dominating arbitral jurisdiction and procedures is one of defined powers limited by
the parties' consent. The submitting states renounce no rights whatsoever except so far as
may appear from the agreement to arbitrate (the compromise). But the jurisdiction of the
Conciliation Commission is compulsory, in the sense that it can effectively be invoked and
initiated by any party to a dispute, without any cooperation from the respondent in organizing
the body of conciliators which is to pass upon the dispute, in setting the procedures, or
defining the questions at issue. The refusal of the respondent duly to designate members of the
Commission, or the latter's failure to appoint the chairman, does not bar further proceedings.
Furthermore, in examining the claims and objections, the Commission is not bound by formal
rules of pleading or evidence, but it decides its own procedures. The Commission has the
authority to make proposals to the parties, with the view of reaching an agreed settlement of
the dispute. The Commission's functions, however, are not wholly conciliatory but also
semi-adjudicative. Its members are "qualified jurists." Its initial jurisdiction is limited by
Article 66(b) to disputes concerning the "application or interpretation" of any of the articles in
Part V of the Convention, which deals with invalidity and termination (the exception being
Articles 53 and 64 whose disputed application and interpretation is subjected to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court). Furthermore, the Commission is required to
issue a "report" that may include conclusions regarding "the facts and questions of law," and
in this sense the report resembles a judicial or arbitral award (see the Convention's Annex, 8
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS712 (1969).
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comings. The authority of the Commission to regulate the conduct of
bargaining not only inside but outside of the conference room is not clear.
In addition, according to Articles 65 and 66, fifteen months should
usually pass from the time a claim is put forward until a request for setting
in motion the conciliation procedure can be made. The Convention's An-
nex also allows a period of four to six months to pass before the Commis-
sion is duly constituted in each particular case. During this two-year
interim period, tacit bargaining may develop and unilateral acts may be
effected. Faits accomplis may be sought before the constitution of the
Commission with the aim of affecting or even "settling" the matter from
the outset of its deliberation. Article 65(5), as we shall see, seems to yield
assent to such practice. Furthermore, the Commission's final "decision" is
not accorded the formal status of a binding decision but only that of a
so-called "report" and "recommendation. ' 7 This may raise additional
problems of enforcement.
Suppose the parties have complied with the procedural requirements,
having lawfully stated their initial positions in formal notifications and in
due time, and having made impressive efforts to arrive at an agreed set-
tlement of the dispute according to Article 33 of the UN Charter, or even
within a Conciliatory Commission, but there are no material results. The
parties, either because they refuse to be moved from their initial positions,
or because they cannot agree on the kind of compromise, reach a stale-
mate. What then? May the claimant state take the "measures proposed,"
and, if not, would the objecting party or parties be justified in enforcing the
agreement against the will of the claimant state? In other words, is with-
drawal from, or termination of, the treaty not authorized except by the
mutual agreement of all parties, or may they also be lawfully made by
unilateral acts of the claimant?
Nowhere in the Convention can an answer or a hint to the desired
answer be found. If any conclusion may safely be drawn from Article 65,
the accompanying commentaries, and the debates in the ILC and the
Vienna Conference, it is that while a standard of conduct has not been
advanced by them, the major emphasis has been of a delimiting character.
There seems to have been a complete agreement on what the "procedural"
provision would not do, but not on what it would do.
Article 65 does not authorize unilateral decision in case of disagreement,
nor does it require that termination or invalidity be effected only by a new
agreement between all parties. At most the Article indicates an intention to
impose an indefinitely greater burden on the claimant party than on the
"The Convention's Annex (6), id., at 713.
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objecting side. The claimant is required to explain the grounds upon which
the claim is based, to submit a proposal, and to specify a reasonable time
for the reply of the other party or parties. The objecting side is required
only to raise an "objection" within the specified time.
Since the Convention does not contain policies relating to self-help
enforcement measures and sanctions, a party who has the power to bring
about termination can content itself with the proposed Convention. A party
who has the power to force compliance with the treaty can also justify the
decision by the Convention. Both arguments will be equally well founded.
Article 65 furnishes the parties with a convenient verbal justification for
any decision, but not with policies to guide a decision.
Obscurity in prescribed provisions is not always an anomaly which
results from mixed prescriptive motives or from analytical confusion. Some
obscurity must inevitably exist in any legislation since it aims at general-
izing policies. Furthermore, ambiguity may on occasion be a tactful and
useful technique. What seems to be in our case a violation of the law of
identity (an act cannot be both forbidden, and authorized at the same time),
is not necessarily a violation of the logic of life. A determination of whether
"termination" should be authorized cannot be simply an affirmative or
negative answer to the question in general. An appropriate response would
involve broader considerations.
A balance of the policies at stake should be made and related to a
specific context. The context that must be taken into account is, of course,
not merely or chiefly "procedural," but should include the whole setting of
the problem. This context includes components such as the specific values
at stake, the time and crisis factors, and the potentialities for amelioration
of the deprivatory effects of the decision. To say that the "termination of
agreements" is a variable concept and that answers to the problem depend
on a multitude of specific factors, is not to say that an appropriate level of
generality in formulating the relevant policies can never be attained.
After all, it is a minimum goal requirement that stability of expectation
be maintained through formal authority: general policies, principles, rules
and regulations. A rule making behavior solely dependent on the "context"
is not a rule at all. Contexts by definition vary. Nor does it provide
guidance to decision-makers. At the barest minimum one requires a state-
ment of policy, a reference to the contexts and a way of making those
references empirical. What may be required in the articulation of formal
authority is not the rule or the answer to all situations, but answers more or
less suitable to certain categories of decisions.
The most important contribution of the Convention to the enforcement
and termination of treaties is, therefore, that it does not refer at all to the
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traditional concept of "unilateral termination." The Convention is a clear
authority for the terminable character of treaties, and for the view that
something less than a new agreement between the parties, or a decision of
a tribunal, is required for such a termination. Any bargaining is a sequence
of reciprocal choices, either made by the parties simultaneously or succes-
sively. Each step in the development of a given conflict requires in itself a
decision by the parties or by the general community.
In other words, a -"decision of termination" is usually partitioned into
subsets of decisions, which may be usefully distinguished from one an-
other. The weakness of the Convention is that it stops short of regulating at
least some of the various acts that together constitute a conflict about
termination (e.g., the duty to negotiate, the topic for discussion, the prob-
lem of compensation, the lawfulness of certain unilateral acts, reprisals,
retaliations.) 8 It may be suggested that, since the Vienna Convention does
not contain a provision pertaining to these matters, such a provision be
included in each treaty during negotiation.
Given the previous state of legal doctrines, there can be no doubt that
the rejection of "unilateral termination" of a treaty as an operational
concept is in itself, an important step forward in the regulation of termina-
tion controversies. This indivisible concept has historically been relevant
only where the possibility of conflict escalation and reciprocal efforts to set
limits and bounds to disputes did not exist. That the authors of the Vienna
Convention, who could not agree on any specific measures in connection
with termination and invalidity controversies, were intent at least on reject-
ing the traditional either-or distinction of "unilateral termination" is evident
from an examination of Article 65(5). This provision clearly treats "unila-
8An analogy can be made between international bargaining on treaty termination and
domestic collective bargaining between labor and management on the renewal and revision of
labor contracts. Both situations often involve bargaining between organized entities with the
aim of value redistribution. In both cases the basic community policies in introducing legisla-
tion to regulate the disputes have been to encourage the parties to reach agreed solutions by
free bargaining and to check arbitrary or unfair procedures, while not imposing involuntary
substantive settlements on the parties, however just or desirable they may seem to be to the
larger community. Both situations often involve refusal to negotiate and unilateral acts during
bargaining. The Tart-Hartley Act 8, 61 Stat. 141 (1947); 29 U.S.C. 158 (1952) provides that
it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or for a labor union to refuse to bargain
collectively on specified issues. The National Labor Relations Board and Courts have in-
terpreted this provision as a duty to desire agreement and "to make some reasonable effort in
some direction to compose his differences with the union." NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg.
Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (Ist Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). Activities
which were originally regarded as evidence of negotiation in bad faith in a truly subjective
test, often have come to be sufficient proof standing alone. Unilateral actions while dis-
cussions are taking place have come to be considered per se violations of the Act. Consult
Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor Action?9 VAND. L. REV.487
(1956).
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teral termination" as a temporary move, or a sequence of interdependent
moves in the larger context of bargaining, and not as a final outcome.
B. A "Notification" After the Fact
It has been suggested during the preceding discussion that the Con-
vention's solution to the problem of unilateral termination has the in-
evitable effect of equating authority with control. The accuracy of this
observation can be tested by an examination of Article 65(5).
That provision seems to provide for an exception to what is supposed to
be a general rule, that the claimant party should first notify the other
parties, explaining the grounds upon which the claim is based and should
then wait at least three months for the other side's reply. Unlike the rest of
Article 65, subsection 5 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is too
vague to connote any definite idea. The "exception" is relatively clear,
though it is at the same time broad enough to override the entire article,
and to give a definite, perhaps undesirable, meaning to the solution ad-
vanced in the Convention. Subsection 5 is clear evidence that a minimum
order, strictly defined, was the sole consideration of the drafting of Article
65. It reads as follows:
Without prejudice to Article 45, the fact that a State has not previously made
the notification prescribed in paragraph I shall not prevent it from making
such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the
treaty or alleging its violation.9
This provision does not deal with noncompliance due to a special hard-
ship or inconvenience, since cases of "special urgency" are explicitly dealt
with in subsection 2. But to construe the above-quoted provision as apply-
ing to all situations and all kinds of agreements is to drain Article 65(1) of
all significance. To what situations, then, was the provision intended to
apply? The phrases "claim for performance" and a party "alleging a viola-
tion," suggest that the primary reference is to obligatory treaty provisions
rather than executed or territorial ones. By "executed" treaties is meant
treaties that concern for at least one party relatively consummated transac-
tions like the conveyance of a territory, leases and perhaps servitudes, and
other treaties that have already been performed in whole or in part.
The distinction between these two categories of treaty provisions is one
of degree, not of kind. All international agreements project policies into the
future. Even the conveyance of a territory implies a pattern of future
conduct on the part of both parties with respect to the territory transferred.
Of course, like any distinction of degree, the categorization of treaties into
9 Note 3 supra.
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"real" or "executed" and "obligatory" is also hard to maintain in certain
cases.
"Executed," "earned," "acquired" or "real" rights are species of proper-
ty, and as usual in concepts of property law, they rigorously draw upon
black and white distinctions that would be out of place in most areas of
law, including that of ordinary contract. The objection to the application of
principles of termination and invalidity such as the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus ° to executed treaty provisions is based on policy consideration;
to admit that consummated transactions can be affected by later changes in
circumstances, would expose territorial and other possessions to in-
security, and this insecurity would increase in direct proportion to the
length of time in possession.
The executed international agreement has, however, an additional quali-
ty not shared by contracts and treaties in general. One difference between
"real" or "executed" and "obligatory" rights, relates to the manner in
which these rights are respected and complied with. Generally, compliance
with the former is negative, in the sense that it consists of refraining from
action. Once the agreement is performed, it does not require continuous
positive action by the grantor state. By the same token, unilateral termina-
tion of the agreement or the "real right" can effectively be made only by an
act of overt coercion.
Any termination of a treaty, when made against the will of the other
party or parties, can be regarded as coercive, since it results in deprivation.
But in the given situation, the coercion involved is far more excessive. In
treaties that have already been performed, apart from the depriving effects
of the termination, the means by which the decision can be carried out
unilaterally necessarily involve a direct act of coercion, strictly defined. If
the value preponderance is in the hands of one side, and the subject matter
of the treaty is a strip of territory or a physical res, termination by means of
self-help is usually limited to physical seizure.
From the point of view of minimum order, it is of course preferable not
to encourage the party claiming termination to resort to unilateral coercive
acts, physical or otherwise, and at any rate, not before prior notification of
the claim and the making of a "proposal" with the aim of reaching some
sort of a mutual understanding.
Article 65(5) seems to acquiesce in a fait accompli, provided it is not
10 Many writers exclude from the application of principles of termination, "executed" and
"territorial" treaties. See e.g., Hill, note I supra, at 15; F. VALI, SERVITUDES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1950). A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 256 (1961). Similarly,
Article 62 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties (changing conditions) is restricted to
"obligations still to be performed under the treaty."
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made by an act of overt coercion. The provision does not state that in these
"certain" cases a party need not comply with the requirements of making a
prior notification justifying the claim, and submitting a proposal, but only
that noncompliance with these requirements would not have deprivational
consequences on the claimant state. The difference, however, is only ver-
bal, for the results are quite the same.
If a party is allowed, after a fait accompli, to invoke the grounds for
termination in answer to a demand for performance, or to a complaint
alleging a violation, it is in fact allowed to bring about not only unilateral
termination, but to do so without the making of a prior notification and the
formal forwarding of a claim. While it may be conceded that, formally
speaking, to "stop performance" is not exactly to "terminate" the treaty, in
practice the effects of the two decisions (except in consummated transac-
tions in which the decision involves a physical seizure or another coercive
overt act) may be quite the same.
It is true that after a fait accompli the parties would still be bound to
"seek a solution" through the pacific means indicated in Article 33 of the
Charter, or may try to settle the matter within a conciliation commission,
so that the decision could be formally regarded as one of "suspension" of
the treaty rather than of "final termination." However, a fait accompli of
this sort changes the bargaining position of the parties and may decisively
determine the final outcome of the dispute. Indeed, the phrase "in answer
to another party alleging a violation of the treaty," suggests that a fait
accompli, made before or during direct negotiation, is lawful, if only the
substantial grounds for terminating the treaty are later seriously invoked.
The above conclusion may be disconcerting to many who regard the task
of international norms as that of "suppressing" arbitrariness and checking
on "bad faith." The authors of the Convention should by no means be
criticized for what seems to be the meaning of Article 65(5). It appears
clear from a review of international practice, that to prevent a party from
invoking the policies for termination and invalidity merely because it has
not forwarded a prior notification of its claim, though theoretically work-
able, is unrealistic.
Each of the "unilateral acts" during the bargaining process is usually
only one of the many possible moves. It is by no means "final," and its
effect on the continuation of the dispute, or on its outcome, depends to a
large extent on the other side's reaction to it. Indeed, as will be further
explained, the tendency of governments to debate continually, even after
the facts, serves to limit the lateral expansion of conflicts.1 1 A rule forfeit-
'IT. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 148 (1966).
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ing the right to invoke the policies and principles of termination in all cases
of afait accompli would have abolished just those benefits that the require-
ment of a prior notification is intended to create.
Literalism of this kind may dissipate those benefits that spring from the
invocation of authority in bargaining situations. The form-free and the
stuffy literal decision-makers are equally threats to effective bargaining
and, thus, to reaching an agreement. Rigid insistence on literal conformity
may be a neurotic symptom and may in certain contexts create community
discord. People who are always demanding their formal "rights" are no less
troublesome to the community than the violator of rights.' 2 A party that
insists on its procedural "rights" is not likely to proceed much further.
Indeed, literalism of this sort may purposely be maintained by negotiators
as a useful tactic to avoid or wreck direct negotiations on a certain ques-
tion.
C. Examples of Faits Accomplis
Agreements between states are always under some stress for change.
The demand may be for comparatively minor amendments or temporary
suspension on through to total abrogation; the demand may be brought by
parties to the agreement or by outsiders. In the vast number of cases in the
relatively unorganized contemporary world, these claims and read-
justments take place in unstructured interactions, in which parties are
constantly realigning themselves in matters of reciprocal accommodation,
in what often seems to be unilateral action in an atmosphere of conflict. It
is in such contexts that the complementary community policies both of
establishing and maintaining a creative and productive stability in ex-
pectations and of promoting essential change toward an improved public
order of human dignity come into clearest confrontation.
The problem of termination of authoritative arrangements necessarily
involves examination of larger numbers of interrelated issues. It concerns,
among others, the empirical and conceptual analysis of legitimacy and
bargaining power, and the interstimulations of normative directives, claims,
proposals, promises, warnings, threats and unilateral acts. Evaluation and
prescriptive recommendation require detailed analysis of short-term cur-
rent practices as well as consideration of the long-range inclusive policies
of an emerging global structure of authority.
The failure to provide some meaningful policy guidelines will certainly
complicate future applications of the relevant provisions of the Con-
12See generally, Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV., at
3,11.
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vention. Clearly, the pressing demand is for operational formulae of the
community interest in both stability and change, with some way of exam-
ining the projected contexts to determine which of alternate choices will
actually maximize the inclusive interest. Studies of termination should
undertake, inter alia, to identify destructive practices for future regulation,
so that international agreements can be relied on as effective factors in
international behavior and, in the longer run, precipitate fundamental con-
stitutive changes.
The purpose of this section is, therefore, to explore a limited portion of
these largely unorganized, controversial aspects of treaty termination as a
way of gaining insight into the dynamics of unilateral actions in the global
arena. The Convention on the Law of Treaties, it has been pointed out,
does not proscribe actual moves during bargaining on termination, even
when they are not preceded by formal notification. It is worthwhile, there-
fore, to examine in this context some such instances of faits accomplis and
faits quasiment accomplis.13
There are ample reasons why unilateral acts are common in termination
conflicts. Some of these reasons are inherent in the unique features of this
particular type of conflict situation. In the familiar type of termination
controversies, the objecting side stands to lose those physical issues that
the claimant party may win. The point of origin in the conflict is usually the
disputed treaty, from which changes in the allocation of values are mea-
sured. It is a break-even point which divides for the parties the plus side
from the minus side. 14
In conflicts of termination, outcomes ranging from total termination to
any sort of revision of the treaty, represent immediate gains to the claimant
party and losses to the objecting side. If the objecting side wins the dispute
and the value-allocation as represented in the treaty is upheld, it is neither
a gain nor a loss to any side, assuming no change in circumstances. The
logic of the situation clearly favors the objecting side since the most that it
can expect to win is the status quo. The best strategy under such circum-
stances is for the objecting side to invoke the fact that "there is a treaty"
while insisting on keeping out of any bargaining.
13The Soviet government, for instance, announced in 1918 through a radio proclamation
"addressed to everybody" that the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk were denounced. This announce-
ment was regarded in 1925 by a German court as "sufficient expression" that the Soviet
government regarded the treaty as abrogated and invalid. S.E. v. G. & G. in ORFIELD AND
RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 85 (1965).14 F. IKL9, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE 164-81 (1964). The term "treaty" refers here to
the culminating text and not to the larger process of agreement. When the allocation of values
as registered in the treaty does not conform with reality, the actual status quo provides the
convenient criteria of evaluation.
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The claimant usually tries to undermine the validity of the treaty and to
create, by unilateral acts, another point on which the expectations of the
parties can converge, and from which gains and losses will be measured.
Much of the bargaining on termination consists of maneuvers to determine
this initial point of evaluation. It is at this point that the most inclusive
community prescriptions-to which, in effect, many of these maneuvers are
no more than claims-become relevant.
In the absence of effective regulation or third party decision-making, the
conflict will usually continue to be settled by a process of unorganized
bargaining. A major problem in termination and invalidity is the division of
costs or the compensation for the deprivation that is inherent in such a
decision. If the issue of termination of modification is kept separate, it
remains - however divisible the physical object of negotiation is - a gain for
the claimant, a loss for the objecting side. But if two simultaneous negotia-
tions can be brought into a contingent relationship with each other, a
means of compensation is available by way of an exchange. A principal
means of compensation is often concessions on some other subject unre-
lated to the treaty initially in dispute.15
It is tempting for the claimant side in such situations, therefore, to resort
to some unilateral acts, which change the balance of burdens and benefits
to its own advantage in the matter that is sought to be connected (e.g.,
another treaty). By creating an additional dispute, the claimant party usual-
ly renders the proposed connection of issues more attractive to the object-
ing side. The purpose of such acts is often to make direct negotiation or
conciliation on the central demand more attractive to the objecting side. 16
15For a discussion on the expansion of the size of disputes see R. Fisher, Fractionating
Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, The Craigville Papers 91
(R. Fisher ed., 1964).
'
6 For a discussion in these terms of the act of building the wall in Berlin see IKL9, note 14
supra. For many years Britain has firmly rejected a Spanish claim to Gibraltar and rejected
demands for negotiations on this claim on the ground that the Treaty of Utrecht of 1714
confers upon it permanent sovereignty over the territory. In 1966 Spain obtained from the
UN General Assembly a resolution directing the parties to enter into direct negotiation with
the aim of decolonizing the territory (GA Resolution 2231 (XXI), GAOR 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16 (A/63 16) at 74 (1966). By categorizing the dispute as one of "decolonization" the
General Assembly's resolution changed the parties' criterion of evaluation from the treaty in
question to the kind and extent of the desired change. Britain did not totally reject or ignore
the resolution but seized upon it to abandon its own treaty obligations. Following the General
Assembly's resolution Britain conducted a referendum in the territory. The tiny colony was
presented with the alternatives of annexation by Spain or the continuation of British rule. The
decision to conduct the referendum was justified on the ground that colonized "people" are
entitled to self-determination. Nearly all the inhabitants voted to remain British subjects.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1967, p. I, col. I (late city ed.). In another resolution the General
Assembly declared the referendum to be in violation of its previous resolution; GA Resolu-
tion 2353 (XXII), GOAR 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6716), at 53 (1967).
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But often a process of bargaining that is initiated by unilateral acts is
continued to be settled by unilateral acts.
Furthermore, the very fact that previous commitments are demanded to
be unilaterally terminated, frequently suggests that reliance on a party's
additional promises on the same matter and with regard to the future are
equally unreliable. This may also partly explain why a great many conflicts
on termination and invalidity are settled mainly by tacit bargaining rather
than by direct talks. While in direct negotiations offers and promises play a
central role, in tacit bargaining the parties, mainly through unilateral moves
seek "solutions" that may leave each side with the immediate possession of
their gains. Some additional reasons why, and the methods by which,
claimant parties seeking termination wish to bring about a fait accompli in
partial or whole fulfillment of the central demand will be discussed as we
proceed.
Surprising the Opponent
Surprise is the most obvious advantage of a fait accompli, particularly
when the time is carefully calculated. The opponent may be found unpre-
pared for immediate and decisive reaction. When the other side consists of
a number of governments, as is common in treaties of power and security,
they will usually need, before sharing a common front, to consult together
and to agree on the measures to be taken. This is by no means an easy
task, and, at any rate, may take quite some time. "Surprise" and "seizure
of any opportunity" are usually (but not only) practiced by parties who are
traditional opponents. To submit a prior notification of a demand for a
change in the status quo in the context of traditionally hostile parties, is
clearly an invitation to warnings and threats from an adversary who may
wish to stand firm against the demand. The best defense, of course, is to
carry out the act before the threat is made, in which case there may be
neither incentive nor commitment for retaliation.
Such have been, for instance, the circumstances that led to the famous
Declaration of London against the unilateral termination of international
agreements. In 1870, Russia, taking advantage of the general pre-
occupation with the Franco-Prussian War, had begun building a fleet in the
Black Sea, contrary to some multilateral and bilateral obligations. The
official "notification" of the claim came only later. Forwarding a claim to
termination, prior to, or instead of, the fait accompli could have under the
circumstances, resulted in direct negotiations and perhaps in a new agree-
ment among the parties.
But an agreed solution, if not also the start of talks, could have been
delayed until after the temporary crisis between two of the other signatory
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powers had ended. Prussia had no immediate interest in the neutralization
of the Black Sea, and France, already engaged in a war in which it was
eventually defeated, was not in a position to react militarily. The chances
that Britain alone would attempt to enforce the treaty provisions were
indeed nil. The time for the denunciation, then, was tactfully chosen. The
British and French, not being then in a position to reverse the fait accom-
pli, could only accept the decision, and, of course, reaffirm their confidence
in the "sanctity of treaties" in regard to the future. 17
Dropping the Initiative
A fait accompli usually changes the roles the parties assume in bargain-
ing situations. The purpose of the tactic may be to force the other side to
make the initial claim or demand. Typically, there is a difference whether a
party has to initiate a claim or to contend with a counter-claim. The
difference is in timing, in who has to make an offensive move, and in whose
initiative is put to the test. Often, the purpose of unilateral acts is to
maneuver into a new status quo position, from which one can be dislodged
only by an overt act precipitating mutual damage. By a fait accompli the
party may condition its course of action on what the other side does. It
may therefore transfer the actual decision to use violence to the other side,
and evade the direct responsibility for escalating the conflict, making the
outcome depend mainly on the opponent's decision. The objecting side is
left with a narrow alternative decision: to acquiesce in the fait accompli, or
to try to reverse it by means of some coercive action. It may benefit more
by choosing the former. 18
Furthermore, the side that put forward a claim is required, formally, and
normally also by third-party pressure, to make an attempt at persuasion
before committing a coercive act on the alleged violator of the treaty.
"7Declaration as to Non-alteration of Treaties Without Consent of Contracting Parties,
London, Jan. 17, 1871, in H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 912- 13 (1952). The Declaration
of London is commonly considered as the authority against unilateral denunciation or termina-
tion. For additional discussion of the circumstances leading to the Declaration see TSENG
Yu-HAo, TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1931); Cor-
bett, Social Basis of the Law of Nations, 85 RECUEIL DES COURS VO. 1, 471, 504 (1954). W.
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 366 (1917) challenges the Declaration on the
ground that Russia as a reward for its submission to the Declaration was given what it had
affected to have. For the treaty provisions abrogating the demilitarization provisions of the
Treaty of Paris by "mutual consent" see BRIGGS, id., at 910. It should be emphasized that the
desire to paper over a unilateral breach of a treaty with a seal of "mutual consent" was less an
act of hypocrisy and concern with the past, than a concern to communicate a shared intention
to police treaties in the future.
IsConsultT. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 138- 139 (1961). For the use of
this tactic in the Cuban quarantine of 1962 and in connection to the erection of the Berlin
Wall in 1961, consult Lipson, Castro on the Chessboard of the Cold War, in CUBA AND THE
UNITED STATES 178, 193 (Plank ed., 1967).
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Currently, the only claims for changes in the status quo that receive the
serious consideration of the international community are those involving
threats to the peace. Procedures for effecting changes are generally consid-
ered in terms of such threats, rather than in terms of the material needs of
the particular states and the validity of their claim.19
The pressures applied by third-party governments and international or-
ganizations to the parties to particular disputes, are usually concerned with
the immediate preservation of minimum order. They are, therefore, di-
rected mainly at the party on whose initiative the outburst of violence
appears to depend. An example is the Anglo-Egyptian dispute of 1947.
Egypt brought its claim for the termination of the British military bases in
the Suez Canal zone before the United Nations Security Council (this was
the first time a claim based on the principle of rebus sic stantibus was put
forward there).
The British view was that the case did not involve any threat to in-
ternational peace and security unless Egypt itself intended to break the
peace, instead of accepting the provisions of the treaty which were binding
on it. This view was widely accepted among the Council's members and
the issue was shelved. 20 A similar Tunisian complaint to the Security
Council regarding the French military base at Bizerta was shelved in 1952,
but in 1961 violence erupted in connection to this base, and a Tunisian
complaint brought about a prompt General Assembly resolution favoring
the Tunisian claim. 21
Whether it is intended or otherwise, one gain of afait accompli is to shift
the initiative for the resumption of direct talks or the resort to adjudication
to the other side. The International Court has been generally reluctant to
exercise the termination function expressly. There have been few explicit
judicial cases of termination, and in them the Court declined on various
procedural grounds to pass judgment on the merits of the substantive
issues involved.22 The party in the position of countering a claim can,
therefore, win the dispute, or at least the court-centered phase of the
match, by the default of the Court.
Besides, delays in answering correspondence before and during negotia-
tions or adjudication, evasions in the form of "negotiations" about the
desired procedure for settling the dispute (e.g., whether to call the proce-
19See F. DUNN, PEACEFUL CHANGE 12 (1937).20See Briggs, Rebus Sic Stantibus Before the Security Council, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 762
(1949). The bases were terminated in 1954, indeed only after violence had erupted against the
British forces in the Canal zone.
21U.N. Doc. A/PV 1000 at 28 (Aug. 23. 1961). Consult Lester, Bizerta and the Unequal
Treaty Theory, II INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 847 (1962).22See note 4 supra.
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dure "direct negotiations" or merely "discussions," arbitration, Con-
ciliation Commission), and delays due to the conduct of talks about talks
(e.g., the "agenda", preconditions) usually operate to the disadvantage of
the party who initiates the claim. The longer the lapse of time from the
alleged violation, the harder it is for the party demanding the performance
of the treaty to justify a coercive act in the enforcement of the treaty.
Furthermore, during the interval, the parties may have to go about their
business as usual. Conditions may change and relationships, in general,
may develop. Two years later an ad hoc Conciliation Commission may
perhaps be established to review the violation in the past. After another
year, more or less, this Commission may issue a report recommending
perhaps that the parties would restore the status quo ante. Will the Com-
mission's decision accomplish anything at this late date?
The outcome previously achieved in the course of effective tacit bargain-
ing is likely to be more viable than a legal document of dubious formal
validity and addressed to a situation which is three or four years out-
dated.23 Besides, at this late date the originally "objecting party" would
still face the decision whether to commit resources and try to enforce the
Commission's report. The situation favors the party who is confronted with
countering a claim, since it may win by default if the other party does not
immediately react.
The Tactic of the "Final Decision"
A maneuver into a fait accompli may supply a government with a
commitment not to concede in negotiation. The aim may be to make an
"irreversible" maneuver, the effects of which are the reduction of the
government's own freedom of choice and renunciation of its own alterna-
tives. Parties in international negotiations are not unitary decision-makers.
Other governments, domestic politics, domestic governmental branches,
bureaucratic differences within the executive branch, and other factors
alike, influence the parties' objectives and negotiating tactics. Since a
government must continuously deal with these influences and obstacles, it
must, if it can, arrange to make any retreat in negotiations dramatically
visible. In this way the government places its reputation and effectiveness
in jeopardy, and thereby becomes visibly incapable of serious concessions.
The conflict in 1966 between the United States and France, concerning
the removal of American military bases and installations from French
territory, along with NATO's Council and Headquarters, is instructive.
23For a discussion of a similar situation in domestic collective bargaining see Cox, The
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1958).
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
104 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
The French demand was presented in the form of afait accompli,24 but in
this particular case, it was impossible for France to create a fait accompli
in any true sense. France, in the case of the bases, could not unilaterally,
and without previously submitting an official notification of the claim, fulfill
its demand (i.e., "territorial" or "executed" rights). Such a decision would
have required a forceful eviction of the bases, an act which is unthirikable
in the case of friendly nations, and which is dangerous in the case of hostile
ones.
The only way open to the French government was to forward to the
United States a demand for the immediate removal of the bases and a
demand to NATO to transfer its headquarters. Nevertheless, the French
government managed to achieve the effects of a commitment not to re-
consider and compromise, by presenting the demand not in the form of a
claim to termination but in the form of a "decision" of termination. To
support this appearance of "finality," the French government refused to
enter into negotiations on the question of termination. In other words, the
French government, though it was the claimant party in the dispute,
maneuvered itself into the typical position of the objecting side in termina-
tion controversies.
Sometimes negotiation cannot be dispensed with. Negotiation is neces-
sary for any termination in which complicated forms of collaboration be-
tween the parties must be established in pursuit of the decision. In the
Franco-American dispute, negotiation had still to be conducted on in-
cidental matters such as the transportation of withdrawing troops, the
gradual dislocation of installations, and the storage of equipment that
would be left behind. But the conduct of negotiation between the parties
could undermine the French insistence that the "decision" was "final."
The French government, therefore, proposed to talk only on the "practical
matters" involved in the decision.
Negotiations on the distinction between "practical" and "political" mat-
ters were conducted for quite a long time. The other fourteen members of
NATO established a five-power committee and asked the French govern-
ment to negotiate with this committee. The French government refused to
do so. In a conference of all the foreign ministers of the alliance, the
French Foreign Minister told his colleagues that France was willing to
enter into talks, but that he saw no political issues requiring negotiations on
the diplomatic level. France insisted that the "technical arrangements" and
other questions following the "decision" could be dealt with on a lower
2 4See President de Gaulle's letter of March 7, 1966 to President Johnson, printed in N.Y.
Times, March 8, 1966, p. 2, col. I (city ed.).
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level and through ordinary channels, such as between military command-
ers. This question of how important the issues involved were was so
important that the fifteen foreign ministers spent two whole days in unsuc-
cessfully trying to resolve it.
The fact that it is difficult for a government to change a decision that has
already been made and implemented may provide a government with an
extra incentive to resist the opponent's pressures. The usual noisy reac-
tions to "denunciations," "breaches," and "violations" of international
agreements also assure the required publicity and incitement for such a
commitment. Governments that, while ceasing to perform a treaty still
desire to leave the door open for a change in their initial position, or a
reversal of their decision following further bargaining or negotiation, may
wish to cloak the repudiation in secrecy. It is not uncommon for parties to
termination controversies to fail to forward an official notification of their
decision to cease performance of a treaty to the other side. Often, the
objecting side too, for similar considerations, does not forward an official
demand for performance or an official complaint alleging a violation of the
treaty obligations.
Bringing the controversy into the open may commit the contending
governments to irreversible positions and invite pressures upon them to
expand the dispute by way of overt acts and reprisals. While the French
demand for the removal of the bases cannot be said to fall within the
exception of Article 65(5), the same dispute involved the unilateral termi-
nation of other agreements on which both parties at the time of the
termination preferred to remain silent. Only in 1966, the parties respective-
ly revealed to the public, that the other party had resorted to faits accom-
plis in treaty terminations a year or two earlier. Notifications of the claims
were dispensed with, "claims for performance" -to use the wording of
Article 65(5)-were not officially forwarded, and "complaints on viola-
tions" were not formally submitted at the time of fait accompli. Both
parties respectively stated to the public for the first time the history of
outright repudiation of agreements by the other side, only when it became
apparent that their conflicting positions in the dispute were already irre-
versible and incapable of accommodation. 25
25n November 1964 the United States, in reaction to French previous withdrawal of
naval forces from NATO's integrated-command arrangements, ceased to perform a bilateral
agreement, entered into in 1959 (10 U.S. TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS, V. 2, at
1279), to provide France with enriched uranium. For the late disclosure of the incident by the
French government see N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1966, p. 24, col. I (city ed.). For a discussion of
a similar French termination of a System of Communications Agreement, and other agree-
ments without giving an advance notice see Sulzberger, Foreign Affairs: Alliance Against
Itself, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1966, p. 46, col. 3 (late city ed.). Other faits accomplis in direct
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Article 65(5), according to which the parties in ceasing to fulfill an
obligation may dispense with a prior notification of their claim, serves
precisely this function of helping the parties to preserve the alternatives by
not committing themselves in advance to too rigid a position.
relationship to the Franco-American dispute of 1966 were French termination of overflight
rights to American military aircraft, and the termination of various tax exemptions to Ameri-
can personnel in France (by "re-interpretation" of some treaty provisions). The U.S. threat-
ened to deny France the benefits of the European alarm system, and the use of some nuclear
warheads stored in Germany. In "retaliation" France withdrew from Germany some of its air
units. For a comprehensive discussion of this conflict see Stein and Carreau, Law and
Peaceful Change in a Subsystem: "Withdrawal" of France from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (1968).
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